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WHREN V UNITED STATES AND
PRETEXTUAL TRAFFIC STOPS: THE
SUPREME COURT DECLINES TO PLUMB
COLLECTIVE CONSCIENCE OF POLICE
I. INTRODUCTION
What are the constitutional limits of a routine traffic stop? For a
police officer engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime, a motorist's minor traffic violation can be the key to unlocking
a Pandora's box of other suspected criminal activity.' To illustrate,
suppose a police officer has a hunch that you are carrying drugs, and
he or she wants to stop your car to investigate this hunch. The hunch
could be based on anything: your race, your age or that deadhead
sticker on your Cadillac. Although the officer does not have the nec-
essary suspicion to stop you to investigate whether you are carrying
drugs, he or she can stop you if you are violating the traffic code. 2
Because few drivers comply with all of the requirements of the traffic
code, the requirement that the officer observe a traffic violation is not
a serious impediment to stopping you.'
Once you pull over, the police officer can order you and your
passengers out of the car.' The officer can then ask you to consent to
a general search of your car and can use the opportunity to ask
you questions unrelated to the traffic stop.' If at any time the officer
observes any contraband in plain-view, then he or she can seize it
without going through the trouble of obtaining a warrant.'' The police
officer can also frisk you or your passengers and search areas of the
See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (1996).
2 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). An officer may stop a motorist when the
officer has "at least articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the motorist has violated a traffic
regulation. See id.
5
 See, e.g., United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782 (2d Cir. 1994) (failing to signal a Jane
change); United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 877 (10th Cir. 1994) (violation of Utah window
tinting law); United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 111 (6th Cir. 1994) (exceeding speed limit and
equipment violations); United States v. Ferguson, 8 E3d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (no
visible license plate); United States v. Meyers, 990 E2c1 1083, 1084 (8th Cir. 1993) (following too
closely); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990) (failure to signal right turn);
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 706 (11th Cir. 1986) (weaving); Skelly v. State, 880 P.2d 401,
404 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (burnt out license plate light).
4 See Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
See Ohio v. Robinette, 116 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996).
II See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
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car where you might have stashed a weapon, if he or she believes that
you are armed.' Moreover, in most states, the officer can place you
under arrest, which would justify an even more thorough search of
you, your car and any containers in your car, such as purses or luggage,
all because of a mere traffic violation. 8
The breadth of these powers makes for efficient law enforcement.
If a motorist is carrying drugs or weapons, the police have a fair chance
of catching him or her. Yet for each motorist who is trafficking drugs,
how many motorists are not? How many purses, suitcases or briefcases
will the police have to rummage through in order to nab one drug
trafficker? The United States Constitution places limits on searches and
seizures to protect the privacy and dignity interests of ordinary citizens,
and society's need for efficient law enforcement must be balanced
against these competing individual rights. 0
The Framers of the Constitution sought this balance in enacting
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guar-
antees "[t] he right of the people to be secure in their persons . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures."'" For a search to be rea-
sonable it must be based on probable cause that the item sought will
be found in the place searched, and in most cases, the Constitution
requires a warrant from a neutral magistrate." The Framers enacted
the Fourth Amendment largely in response to the open-ended writs
issued to officers of the British Crown. 12
 These writs gave officers
unlimited discretion to search any person or place." The Framers
crafted the Fourth Amendment to limit law enforcement's discretion
and to require prior judicial approval of searches and seizures." In
response to the needs of law enforcement, the Supreme Court has
7 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1983).
" See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S, 454, 460 (1981) (authorizing search of interior of motorist's
car); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (authorizing search of person); Barbara
C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Un-
checked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 'amp. L. REA% 221, 250 n.I88 (1989) (listing 28
states that place no limitations on a police officer's discretion to arrest a driver for a traffic
offense). Police still retain wide discretion in the states that have some legislative limitations on
police authority. See Salken, supra, at 251 & n.189. This is because police are only required to
issue citations in a small number of instances or because the limitations on police authority
contain broad exceptions. See id. at 251 n.189.
9 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
1 " U.S. CONST. amend. W.
11 See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 354-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 & 583 n.21 (1980).
13 See id. at 583 n.21.
14 See id. at 585.
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carved out some exceptions to the warrant requirement and has al-
lowed for some searches and seizures on grounds less than probable
cause. •
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of
the proper balance between individual rights and efficient law enforce-
ment. The Court, in Witren v. United States, held that pretextual traffic
stops—stops where the officer pulls a motorist over for a minor viola-
tion in order to investigate a more serious offense for which the officer
does not have the requisite justification—are constitutionally permissi-
ble.'" As long as a police officer is authorized to stop a motorist. for the
stated reason, it is immaterial that the officer had another motive for
initiating the stop. 17
 In this author's opinion, the Court correctly de-
cided Whren. Investigating a police officer's motive for stopping a
motorist is an unproductive exercise and only marginally increases
protection of individual rights. Even though the Court correctly de-
cided Whren, however, taken in context with other recent decisions,
Whren tilts the precarious balance between efficient law enforcement
and individual rights too far to the side of efficient law enforcement.
Because the Court is not going to concern itself with whether an
officer's reason for stopping a person is a pretext, there must be
another check on a police officer's authority to expand a traffic stop
into a much wider search. Rather than examine an officer's motive for
initiating a stop, this Note argues that the better approach is for the
states to take steps to limit the authority of police to expand their
search beyond the apparent justification.
In Section II, this Note examines when a police officer can stop a
motorist and how the officer can use the stop to investigate other
crimes.'s It then discusses in Section HI the different approaches that
federal courts have taken in dealing with pretextual stops.'" Section IV
follows with a discussion of the Whren decision. 2° Finally, Section V
concludes that the Court rightly decided Whren, but that there is a
need for states to limit police discretion to expand a traffic stop into
a much wider search. 21
SeeTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,30-31 (1968).
16
 116 S. Ct. 1769,1774-75,1777 (1996).
17
 See id. at 1774,1777.
18 See infra notes 22-147 and accompanying text.
19
 See infra notes 148-66 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 167-221 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 222-76 and accompanying text.
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II. THE LIMITS OF POLICE DISCRETION
Police can turn a routine traffic stop into a very intrusive search.
This section introduces the techniques police can use to legally justify
wider and wider searches. To initiate a stop, police must have a reason-
able suspicion of some wrongdoing." A traffic code violation is a
convenient way of getting around the justification requirement be-
cause few, if any, motorists are in complete compliance with all traffic
regulations." Although the traffic violation only justifies the initial
stop, once the police have stopped a motorist, the custodial arrest
doctrine, the plain-view warrant exception, the ability to conduct a
consensual search and the opportunity to interrogate all create oppor-
tunities for the police to discover evidence of other criminal activity. 2 4
Thus, a minor traffic violation can be the key to circumventing the
requirement that a police officer have reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity before the officer can initiate a stop. 25
A. The Initial Stop
Police use pretextual stops because otherwise they would have no
way to stop a motorist whom they only vaguely suspect of criminal
activity. A traffic stop implicates the Fourth Amendment; thus, it re-
quires some reasonable, objective justification. 26 Given the breadth of
state traffic regulations, catching a motorist technically violating some
regulation is not difficult." Accordingly, the inability of motorists to
follow all of the rules of the road provides police with a detour around
the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions and in the process, exposes
citizens to arbitrary police searches and seizures.
If a police officer has a hunch that a pedestrian is involved in
criminal activity, the officer may approach the person and inquire
about the individual's activities without implicating the Fourth Amend-
ment." The individual may or may not choose to answer the officer's
22 See Delaware V. Pruuse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 ( 1 979).
23 See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.4(e), at 123 (3d ed. 1996).
21 See Ohio v. Robinette, 116 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40
(1983); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d
1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
25 See Robinette, 116 S. Ct. at 419; Brown, 460 U.S. at 739-40; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235; Causey,
834 F.2d at 1181.
2" See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
27 See cu/Ira note 3.
28
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 11.16 (1968).
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questions, but so long as a reasonable person would believe that he or
she is free to leave or to decline the officer's request, no Fourth
Amendment seizure has occurred. 2° These investigative encounters are
valuable tools for police to dispel or develop the necessary suspicion
to warrant further searches." In 1968, in Terry v. Ohio, the Court
established the constitutional standard for these police investigatory
stops."
In Terry, the Court held that a police officer who had "reasonable
suspicion" that a crime was about to be committed could stop and frisk
a person suspected of planning the robbery of a store." In Terry, a
police officer observed two men suspiciously walking back and forth
in front of a store." The officer approached the men, asked them to
identify themselves and frisked them." The officer found pistols on
both men." The Court found the frisk constitutional and established
"reasonable suspicion" as the standard for police investigatory stops,
which have become known as "Terry" stops." The Court selected the
reasonable suspicion standard by balancing the individual's liberty
interests against the State's need to prevent crime." Consequently,
Terry held that police investigatory stops need only be based on a
reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaging in criminal activity.38
Because a routine traffic stop implicates Terry, police have no
effective way of initiating a consensual traffic stop." Unlike a consen-
sual conversation with a pedestrian, once an officer pulls a motorist
over, a seizure has already occurred." Without justification for the
seizure, a judge must exclude all discovered evidence from the criminal
trial.'" Consequently, because police lack an effective way to initiate a
consensual encounter with a passing motorist, they use a traffic viola-
tion as the basis for the initial stop."
29 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
3° See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U,S. 218, 227 (1973).
31 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 6.
54 See id. at 6-7.
35 See Id. at 7.
36 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
37 Id. at 22, 24, 27.
33 Id. at 27.
39 See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).
4° See id.
41 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
42 See supra note 3.
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B. The Permissible Scope of the Stop
The pretext problem arises when the police expand the scope of
the stop to investigate crimes for which there is no reasonable suspi-
cion and no probable cause:" Although motorists may begrudge the
officer who stopped them, a traffic stop is a reasonable response to an
observed traffic violation: it is minimally intrusive, it lasts for only a
short time, and it is in public:" When motorists are stopped, they
expect that the police officer will require them to render their driver's
license and registration, that the officer may question them about the
observed infraction and that the officer will cite them for the offense. 45
Motorists do not expect to be arrested for the traffic offense, to have
their cars searched for drugs or to be interrogated about unrelated
crimes.46 Thus, the underlying problem is not the pretextual reason
for stopping the motorist but, rather, the subsequent scope of the
search, which can vastly exceed the initial justification for the search. 47
The pretextual stop violates a motorist's expectation of privacy by
unreasonably expanding the scope of the search into areas in which
the motorist has a continued expectation of privacy. 48
The Supreme Court has increased police discretion to expand
searches by rolling back Fourth Amendment coverage through the
creation of exceptions to the warrant requirement and the adoption
of bright-line tests to aid police in knowing what is constitutional. 49 In
creating exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Court limited the
43 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 5.2(e), at 85-86.
44 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e have no doubt,
that in a valid traffic stop, an officer can request a driver's license, insurance papers, vehicle
registration, run a computer check thereon, and issue a citation.")
46 See State v. Retherforcl, 639 N.E.2d 498, 505 (Ohio Ct. App.) ("The very thought of
American citizens, not suspected of any wrongdoing, being asked by the police to search their
cars and luggage before exercising their right to drive the highways of this state is clearly
repugnant to American institutions and ideals."), dismissed, jurisdictional motion overruled by 635
N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 1994); see also State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347, 348-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(describing routine consensual searches of bus passengers). The Kermit* court wrote:
!Pine officer ... admitted that during the previous nine months he, himself, had
searched in excess of three thousand bags! In the Court's opinion, the founders of
the Republic would be thunderstruck. It certainly shocks the Court's conscience
that the American public would be "asked," at badge-point, without the slightest
suspicion, to interrupt their schedules, travels and individual liberties to permit
such intrusions.
Id.
47 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 5.2(e), at 85-86.
4H See Id.
45 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (bright line rule that police can
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judiciary's review of police-initiated searches and thus increased police
discretion. i° Once police have stopped a motorist, the search incident
to arrest doctrine, the plain-view doctrine and the occasion to initiate
a consensual search provide the police with the opportunity to find
and seize evidence of criminal activity without the permission of a
neutral magistrate. Furthermore, the pretextual stop offers police the
opportunity to question a motorist about other criminal activity, usually
without requiring that they provide Miranda warnings.5 '
1. Custodial Arrest and the Search Incident to Arrest Exception
In most states, an officer may arrest a motorist for a traffic viola-
tionP2
 If an officer arrests a motorist, as a matter of course, the officer
may search the motorist and the interior of the motorist's car." The
Court has held that the Constitution allows these limited searches to
prevent evidence from being destroyed and to secure weapons that
might endanger the officer." These vast warrantless search powers
incident to an arrest give police a powerful tool to investigate suspected
criminal activity. Such general searches can occur because neither the
Court nor the state legislatures have stepped in to limit the scope of
police powers of investigation to comport with the justification pro-
vided."
For their part, the state legislatures have given police wide latitude
to arrest motorists for minor offenses. 56
 Incredibly, most states do not
impose any limits on an officer's discretion to arrest a driver for a
search inside of auto pursuant to arrest); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, '235 (1973)
(bright line test that police can search person incident to arrest).
50
 The court has carved out several exceptions to the general requirement Chat police obtain
a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate: searches or suspects incident to arrest (but
still requires probable cause that person committed offense), see. Robinson, 414 U.S, at 235;
searches for items in an automobile (but still requires probable cause that item will be found in
car), see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991); searches initiated because of exigent
circumstances, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967); seizures of items in plain view,
see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); searches based on an administrative
or inventory scheme, see Colorado v. Bertinc, 479 U.S. 367, 369 (1987); consensual searches, see
Schneckloth v. Busiamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1973); short investigative detentions, see Terry,
392 U.S. at 30-31.
51 See Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966).
52 See Salken, supra note 8, at 250 n.188,
53 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
54
 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
55 See Salken, supra note 8, at 274-75 (arguing that custodial arrest. for traffic offenses is
unreasonable and the Court should use Fourth Amendment u limit police authority to at- rest.
motorists for traffic offenses).
56 See Salken, supra note 8, at 250 n.188, 251 n,189.
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traffic offense. 57 Many states that do limit discretion have broad excep-
tions that circumvent the general prohibition and allow an officer to
make a pretextual stop. 58 This wide discretion to arrest for a minor
offense, coupled with the power to search incident to the arrest, gives
police the equivalent of a general warrant to seize persons and search
them.59 By failing to define the circumstances under which the police
may arrest a motorist, legislatures have effectively given police the
power to decide when a search will be reasonable.°
The Supreme Court has also taken a hands-off approach to super-
vising police searches incident to arrest. 6 ' In a series of cases, the Court
adopted bright-line tests to help the police decide whether a search is
permissible. 62 These tests are valuable in that they provide police spe-
cific guidance as to what is permissible. In achieving clarity, however,
the Court has given police broad authority to search persons and
places, even when an officer does not expect to find evidence or
weapons."
In 1973, in United States v. Robinson, the Court held that the power
to search a suspect was automatic, and that courts should not conduct a
case-by-case determination of whether the police should have searched
an arrestee. 64 In Robinson, an officer arrested a motorist for driving
with an expired license." While searching Robinson, the officer discov-
ered heroin tablets inside a cigarette package." 6 Robinson argued that
the police officer had no justification for searching inside the cigarette
package because the package was unlikely to contain further evidence
that Robinson was driving without a license, and a weapon could not
fit inside the small package. 67 The Court rejected this case-by-case
analysis, however, reasoning that the power to search an arrestee is
automatic and should not depend on whether a judge later decides
that the officer had a sufficient probability of Finding weapons or
evidence.° Thus, although the prospect of finding weapons or evi-
57 See Salken, supra note 8, at 250 n.I88.
56 See Salken, supra note 8, at 251 n.189 (listing states that require issuance of a citation for
some offenses and exceptions).
59 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
6° See Salken, supra note 8, at 274.
61 See, e.g., Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
62 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
64 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
64 414 U.S. at 235; see also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 262 (1973) (driver arrested for
driving without license, and subsequent search uncovered marijuana inside a cigarette package).
65 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220.
66 See id. at 223.
67 See id. at 233.
" Id. at 235,
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dence of the suspected crime generally justifies a search incident to
arrest, the Court does not require this justification in any specific cases
In 1981, in New lin* v. Belton, the Court expanded the permissible
scope of a search incident to an arrest by holding that the entire
passenger compartment could be searched incident to the arrest of
the driver and passengers even though the police had removed the
arrestees from the car prior to the search." In Belton, the police officer
stopped the driver for speeding. 7 ' While examining the driver's license
and registration, the officer smelled marijuana. 72 Based on the detec-
tion of drugs, the officer expanded the scope of his investigation." He
ordered the four occupants out of the car, frisked and handcuffed
them, and then searched the interior of the car. 74 The officer found
cocaine in the pocket of Belton's jacket, which lay on the back seat."
Similar to its approach in Robinson, the Court concluded that the need
to secure weapons and evidence justified the search." Rather than
conduct a case-by-case analysis of the appropriate scope of the search,
the Court followed its approach in Robinson by adopting a bright-line
test, permitting the police to search the interior of a car after arresting
the motorist. 77
 In short, Robinson and Belton give police the equivalent
of a general warrant to search a motorist and the interior of his or her
car for the crime of driving with an expired license."
2. Plain-View Exception
If state law does not allow the police to arrest a motorist for a
traffic violation, they might still be able to use the plain-view doctrine
to justify seizing evidence or initiating a more intrusive search." Once
an officer stops a motorist, the plain-view doctrine allows the officer to
seize any evidence within the officer's plain view without a warrants
In order for the plain-view warrant exception to apply, an officer's
initial stop must be lawful (the officer must have had probable cause
"" Id.
75 453 U.S. at 460.
71 Id. at 455.
72 See id.
73
 See id. at. 456.
74
 See id.
75 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.
7" Id. at 459, 460.
77 Id.
78 See id.; Robinson, 414 U,S. at 235.
75
 SeeArizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S, 321, 326 (1987).
8" See id.; see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (authorizing police officer to
seize evidence discovered when he shined his flash light into car during road side stop).
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to believe a traffic violation occurred); the officer must discover the
item within the confines of a lawful stop; and the officer must imme-
diately recognize that the item is contraband or evidence of a crime. 8 '
Thus, the plain-view doctrine would not allow a police officer to rum-
mage through a motorist's possessions to "discover" evidence!' The
rationale behind the plain-view exception is that it makes no sense to
require police to obtain a warrant to seize items that they have already
lawfully discovered."
Prior to 1990, the plain-view exception applied only to items that
the police inadvertently discovered." If the police expected to find an
item in the area searched, then they had to include that item in a
warrant. 85 In 1990, the Supreme Court did away with the inadvertence
requirement, finding that it offered no additional privacy protection
to the defendant. 86 The effect of this decision is that police do not need
to go through the trouble of obtaining a search warrant if they expect
the item to be in plain view and they have a pretextual reason for
lawfully entering.87
The scope of the plain-view exception is further broadened by an
officer's ability to ask drivers and passengers to exit a vehicle incident
to a traffic stop." This power provides an officer with a better view of
the motorist and passengers, where they were sitting and anything that
might happen to fall out of the car when they exit. Until recently,
police could only order passengers out of a car if they had a reason,
however, following the 1997 decision in Maryland v. Wilson, they can
now do so as a matter of course."
In Wilson, the Court held that an officer may routinely order
passengers out of a car pending the completion of a traffic stop." A
state trooper observed a speeding car and signaled for it to pull over. 91
After continuing for another mile and a half, the car finally pulled
over.92 During the pursuit, the passengers repeatedly turned to look at
81 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,130,136-37 (1990).
92 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328.
" See id. at 327.
See Horton, 496 U.S. at 130.
85 See id.
See id. at 141-42. The death of the inadvertence requirement foreshadowed Witten in that
the Horton Court indicated that pretext and subjective motivations were no longer important.
See id.
87 See id. at 130.
g8 See Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 889 (1997).
89 See id.
is' Id.
91 See id.
92 See id.
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the trooper and then ducked out of sight." When the trooper ap-
proached the car, he noticed that Wilson, a passenger, was sweating
and appeared extremely nervous, thus he ordered him out of the car."'
As Wilson exited, crack cocaine fell to the ground." 5 The officer sub-
sequently arrested Wilson, and Wilson moved to suppress the narcotics
on the grounds that the order to exit the car was an unreasonable
seizure." 6 The Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and held that
the evidence was admissible." 7
 In reaching this decision, the Court
balanced the government's interest in protecting the safety of police
from attacks by passengers against the liberty interests of the passen-
gers."8 The Court concluded that the danger to police outweighed the
minimal intrusion upon passengers' liberty and thus, established a
bright-line rule that police may order passengers out of a car pending
the completion of a traffic stop."
The danger of Wilson is that an officer bent on using a traffic stop
as an opportunity to investigate drug trafficking can, as a matter of
course, order all of the passengers out of a vehicle in order to expand
his or her plain view."'" This would give an officer an unrestricted view
of the interior of the car and all the passengers. If the officer observes
anything suspicious—a bulge in a passenger's pocket or narcotics para-
phernalia on a seat—the officer would then be justified in further
expanding the search. 1 " 1
3. Consent Exception
Another powerful tool for police to turn a routine traffic stop into
ra full-scale search for evidence of criminal activity is the consensual
search. A consensual search does not require a warrant. 102
 It does not
See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
94 See id.
95 See id.
t"' See id.
97 Id.
98 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885, 886.
Id. at 886.
1 °t See id.
114 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Minims, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977) (officer justified in patting
down motorist who had bulge in jacket).
192
 See Schneckloth V. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). In Schneckloth, a police ()Ricer
stopped is car because one of the headlights and the license plate light were burnt out. kt. at 220.
The police officer asked if lie could search the car. See id. Consent was given and in the trunk,
the officer found three wadded tip checks that came from a car wash that had been robbed. See
id. The Court held that a consensual search must be voluntary based on the totality of the
circumstances and rejected the idea that voluntary consent required informing the subject of the
search that he had the right to refuse consent. Id. at 227. In reaching this holding the Court
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require any suspicion of wrongdoing.'" It does not require that the
consenting person know that he or she has the right to refuse con-
sent. 104
 Moreover, the scope of a consensual search is limited only by
what a reasonable officer would believe the person has consented to.'° 5
This is troubling because the line dividing where a stop ends and where
a consensual search begins is probably not obvious to the average
motorist, and there is a danger that motorists are not voluntarily
consenting to these searches.
Once police have lawfully stopped a motorist, they may expand
their search after obtaining the consent of the motorist.'" Unlike a
waiver of the right to counsel or the right against self incrimination, a
waiver of a person's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches does not have to be informed; it need only be voluntary. 107
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not
require that a person know he or she has the right to refuse consent
before consenting.'"This is disturbing because the Court has implicitly
authorized police to take advantage of a citizen's ignorance of his or
her rights.'" In determining whether consent is voluntary, the Court
only asks whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officer's request."°
In 1996, in Ohio v. Robinette, the Supreme Court overturned the
Ohio Supreme Court and again held that the Fourth Amendment does
not require the police to inform a lawfully-seized motorist that he is
reasoned that consensual searches arc important to law enforcement: in situations where the
police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search*
authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable
evidence." Id.
"See id. at 227.
01
 See id.
105 See Florida v. jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
1 °6
 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 222, 227.
107 See id. at 227.
3 °8 See id.
" See id.
11 ° See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). In Bostick, two officers boarded a bus and
asked to inspect Bostick's ticket and identification. Id. at 431. They advised Bostick that they were
searching for drugs and asked if they could search his luggage. See id. at 431-32. Bostick was
informed that he did not have to consent. See id. at 432. Bostick consented, drugs were found
and lie was arrested. See id. Bostick moved unsuccessfully to suppress the drugs. See Bostick, 501
U.S. at 432. On appeal, Bostick argued that the drug sweep of the bus per se implicated the
Fourth Amendment. See id. at 433. The Florida Supreme Coon accepted this argument but was
overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that a seizure was determined
by looking at whether under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would have
felt free to decline the officer's request. Id. at 434.
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free to go before his consent will be considered voluntary."' In Ro-
binette, the officer stopped the motorist for speeding-69 mph in a 45
mph zone." 2 After issuing a verbal warning and returning Robinette's
license, the police officer said, "One question before you get gone:
[Alre you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of
any kind, drugs, anything like that?"" 3
 Robinette answered in the
negative." 4 He then consented to a search from which the police
officer discovered drugs." 5
 The Court reasoned that voluntariness is
determined by analysis of all the circumstances and that the officer's
failure to advise Robinette that he was free to go did not per se make
the consent involuntary.''" Thus the Court struck down the prophylac-
tic warning that the Ohio Supreme Court had required in order for
the motorists' consent to be voluntary." 1
Robinette illustrates an interesting wrinkle in Fourth Amendment
analysis: how do motorists know when a stop is finished and they are
free to go? If a police officer approaches a person sauntering down the
street and asks this person if he or she will consent to a search, it is
reasonable to believe that the pedestrian would think he or she has
the right to refuse.' 18 After all, the pedestrian has done nothing to give
the officer the necessary suspicion to justify a search. If, however, a
police officer lawfully stops a motorist and then asks him or her to
consent to a search, it is not clear how this motorist would know he or
she had the right to decline the officer's request absent an express
statement that the motorist is free to leave." 9 This is because two
separate Fourth Amendment events are occurring: the traffic stop and
the consensual search.' 2" Because the consensual search is intertwined
111 Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996). Schneckloth had previously held the same
thing. See 412 U.S. at 227.
112 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 419.
115 1d.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 M. at 421.
117 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421.
" 8
 See, e.g.. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (10)1liccrs do not violate the
Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place,
by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to hint if the person
is willing to listen, or by offering in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers ") 
lig As the Court noted in Berkerner v. McCarthy, "Certainly few motorists would feel free to
. leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so." 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984).
In Berkemer, the Court noted that in most states it is a crime to drive away without permission.
Id.
120 See United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990).
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with the traffic stop, motorists may not believe they have the right to
decline the officer's request. 12 ' If the officer does not tell the motorist
that the stop is concluded and that the motorist is free to go, then the
motorist must decide the extent of his rights by himself.' 22
4. Interrogation for Unrelated Crimes
Beyond offering an opportunity to search, pretextual stops also
provide an officer the opportunity to interrogate a motorist about an
unrelated crime. 12" Police are not generally required to provide Mi-
randa warnings during routine traffic stops. 124 The Supreme Court only
requires police to give Miranda warnings during custodial interroga-
tions, and the Court does not consider routine traffic stops to be
custodial.' 25
 Accordingly, the police can ask a motorist questions in
order to generate the necessary suspicion to justify further detention
or a search.' 26
 Even if the custodial nature of a traffic stop rises to a
level requiring Miranda warnings, once a motorist waives his or her
Miranda rights, the police may question the motorist about any crimi-
nal activity. 127
 In some cases, police have arrested suspects on outstand-
ing warrants for minor crimes just so they can obtain custody and
interrogate the suspects about other crimes.' 28
In 1987, in United States v. Causey, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit upheld a pretextual arrest when it held that the police
could lawfully arrest and interrogate a suspected bank robber based
on an outstanding arrest warrant. 129 The police suspected that Causey
121 See, e.g., State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 507 (Ohio App. Ct. 1994) ("Mt strains
credulity to imagine that any citizen, directly on the heels of having been pulled over to the side
of the road by armed and uniformed police officers in marked patrol cars, would ever feel 'free
to leave' or at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business' in spite of being
told otherwise, when she is then asked investigatory questions by the officers and faced with a
request to search her vehicle for contraband.").
122
 Some courts have used the return of a motorist's license and registration as the point at
which the motorist should know the stop has ended. See, e.g., Werking, 915 F.2d at 1408 (holding
that the return of motorist's license and registration manifested to him that he was free to leave
and that in answering the officer's subsequent questions and consenting to a search, Werking
WAS engaging in a consensual encounter).
123 See United States e Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
124 See Berkerner, 468 U.S. at 440 (holding that motorist's incriminating statements were
admissible because routine traffic stops are not a police dominated atmosphere and thus Miranda
warnings were not required).
125 See id.
1211 See Causey, 834 F.2d at 1181.
127 See C0101;1(10 V. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1987) (holding that a waiver of Miranda
rights does not require police to inform a suspect about all possible subjects of questioning).
128 See, e.g., Causey, 834 F.2d at 1181.
129Idat 1185.
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was involved in a bank robbery but did not have sufficient cause to
arrest him for the robbery.'i 0 Instead of arresting him for the bank
robbery, the police arrested him on an outstanding petty theft arrest
warrant."' During questioning, Causey confessed to the bank rob-
bery.'s2
 In holding that the confession was admissible, the Fifth Circuit
gave tacit approval for the police to use a pretextual reason to initiate
an interrogation of a person whom the police did not otherwise have
sufficient evidence to interrogate.'"
The Supreme Court has also held that police can interrogate
suspects about unrelated crimes without violating a suspect's Miranda
rights." In 1987, the Court in Colorado v. Spring held that a suspect's
awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of
interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect prop-
erly waived his Fifth Amendment privilege.'" Spring was suspected of
murder and the interstate transportation of stolen firearms. 16 Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") agents set up an undercover operation
and arrested Spring for a firearms violation.' 37 Spring waived his Mi-
randa rights and was interrogated about the firearms transactions that
led to his arrest."8
 The agents then questioned Spring about the murder
and he made an incriminating statement.'" At trial, Spring moved to
suppress the statement, arguing that he should have been advised he
was a murder suspect before the questioning and that the police's
failure to do so rendered his statement inadmissible."° The Court held
that the statement was admissible on the grounds that a valid Miranda
waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all informa-
tion that would affect his decision to speak or stand by his rights.m
Accordingly, the ATF agents' failure to inform Spring of their intent
to question him about the murder was held not to violate Spring's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 142
1111) See id, at 1180,
13 ' See id.
1 " See id.
13 ' 1 awry, 834 F.2d at 1185.
134 See. Spring, 479 U.S. at 576-77.
115 Id,
L 1i" See id, at 566.
137 See iii.
138 See id. al 567.
13• See Spring, 479 U.S. to .567,
140
 See id. at 568-69.
Id. at 576-77.
142 See id. at 577.
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C. The Pretext Problem
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments exist as bulwarks against the
vast discretionary powers of the police. ] ' One of the bedrock founda-
tions of the Fourth Amendment is a healthy fear of unchecked power."'
The Framers were clearly concerned with the broad discretionary
powers that the general writs of assistance provided to agents of the
Crown."' This general suspicion of unchecked power led them to
adopt the Fourth Amendment as a guarantee of a citizen's right against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment to pro-
tect citizens from self-incrimination.
The pretext problem arises when police use expansive and vague
state traffic codes to get around these carefully crafted Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protections; in this regard the traffic codes are the same
as the writs of assistance that prompted the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment.' 46
 A traffic stop is not only an opportunity to issue a
citation, but it is also an opportunity to interrogate a suspect and to
search a motorist and his or her car for incriminating evidence. Given
this vast unsupervised power to expand a routine traffic stop into an
increasingly wider and invasive investigation, prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Whren, some courts had attempted to curb the use
of pretextual stops."'
III. THE LAW PRIOR TO WHREN
The Supreme Court made it quite clear in a trilogy of decisions
beginning in 1978 that the subjective intent of the officer conducting
a search is not relevant in determining the constitutionality of the
search."' Although the Court forbade inquiry into an individual officer's
subjective reasons for conducting a search, it was not clear whether the
Court would demand that trial courts ask whether a reasonable officer
143 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 n.21 (1980).
141 See id. at 583 n.21, 584 & ti.23.
145 See id. at 583 n.21.
He' See supra note 3 (listing vague offenses for which police can easily stop motorists).
147 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 55 F.3d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1995); United Stales v.
Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986).
148 See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1978).
There was a time when the Supreme Court was concerned with pretext. In 1932, in United
States v. Leflunvitz, the Court remarked in dicta that lain arrest may not be used as a pretext to
search for evidence." 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932). Later in Junes- v. United States, the Court held that
a search was unconstitutional because the officer's purpose in entering the defendant's home
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would have conducted the search absent the pretextual motive. 14" In
other words, prior to Whren, the Supreme Court had not explicitly
decided whether the police could use the legal justification of a minor
crime as a pretext to stop a person in order to search or interrogate
that person for an unrelated, more serious crime for which the police
did not have reasonable suspicion—a so-called pretextual stop.' 5"
Prior to Whren, the federal courts were split on how to address
pretextual stops."' Some courts tried to discourage pretextual stops by
adopting a test that authorized the stop only if a reasonable police
officer in similar circumstances would have made the stop absent the
pretext. 152 The courts referred to this as the "Would Have Test." Other
federal courts had adopted a test that only looked at whether the
officer had probable cause to make the stop without regard to whether
a reasonable officer would have made the stop.'" The courts refereed
to this as the "Could Have Test."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was
the leading proponent of the Would Have Test. In 1986, in United States
v. Smith, the Eleventh Circuit held that a reasonable officer would not
have stopped the appellants unless the officer had an invalid purpose
to obtain additional evidence of criminal activity, and thus, it reversed
the appellants' convictions. 154 In Smith, a police officer stopped the
appellants because they matched the officer's drug profile: they were
approximately thirty years old; the car had out-of-state tags; the driver
was overly cautious; and the appellants did not look at the police officer
when they passed him. 155 On appeal, the government argued that the
was to search for evidence and not to arrest. 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958). In Jones, the Court
was willing to consider an officers' subjective motivation for conducting the search—namely the
officers' testimony about their intent. Id. at 500. Pretext still retains some force for searches, such
as administrative searches, conducted in the absence of suspicion. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 369 (1987).
145 The Federal Circuit Courts were split on the issue. Compare Hernandez, 55 F.3d at 446,
and Smith, 799 F.2d at 708, with United Stales v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F,3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995)
(en bane), and United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 784 (2d Cir. 1994), and United States v. Hassan
El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993), and United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir.
1991), and United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990), and United States v.
Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1185 (5th
Cir. 1987) (en bane), and United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir, 1987).
15° See supra note 149 (comparing circuit split).
151 See id.
152 See Hernandez, 55 F.3d at 446; Smith, 799 F.2d at 708.
153 See Botem-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787; Scopo, 19 F.3d at 784; Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730; Mitchell,
951 F.2d at 1295; Cummins, 920 F.2d at 501; 7'rigg, 878 F.2d at 1041; Causey, 834 F.2r1 at 1185;
Hawkins, 811 F.2d at 213.
154 799 F.2d at 708.
155 Id. at 706.
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stop was proper because the officer had observed the car weaving, and
thus, he could have stopped the car to investigate whether the driver
was drunk.' 54 The Eleventh Circuit observed that the officer had no
interest in investigating a drunk driving charge.' 57 He saw that the
driver was driving with an abundance of care; he began pursuit before
noticing the weaving; and once he stopped the vehicle, he did not
investigate the possibility of intoxication.'" Based on this record, the
court concluded that a reasonable officer would not have stopped the
appellants to investigate a drunk driving charge, that this rationale was
pretextual and, accordingly, that the stop was unreasonable.' 59 The
Eleventh Circuit was concerned with the underlying rationale for Terry
stops.' 69 The court thought that if police could conduct Terry stops
based on reasonable suspicion of minor violations, the nexus between
the justification for the seizure and the scope of the seizure would
necessarily break down. 16 ' Consequently, the court applied the Would
Have Test—whether a reasonable police officer would have stopped
the appellants absent the invalid purpose—to prevent the police from
initiating the random, arbitrary stops that Terry denounced.' 62
Although the Tenth and Fifth Circuits at one point followed the
Eleventh Circuit, by the time the Supreme Court decided Whren the
Eleventh and Ninth Circuits were the only proponents of the Would
Have Test." In June of 1996, the Supreme Court of the United States
finally addressed the split. 164 In Whren v. United States, the Court reaffir-
med that an officer's motive for stopping a suspect is irrelevant and
held that the determination that a search was unreasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes does not depend upon whether a reasonable
'5(i
	 id. at 708.
157 /d. at 710-11.
1511 See id.
1511 Smith, 799 F.2d. at 711.
In° See id. Unlike an arrest or full search, which must be based on probable cause, Terry stops
are of a limited nature; short in duration and limited in scope, police must use the least intrusive
means available to verify or dispel their suspicion. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
Terry stops are an accommodation of the government's need to investigate crime and stop
criminal activity before it occurs and the individual's right to he free from unreasonable searches.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968). Terry stops are predicated on a showing of reasonable
suspicion, See id. at 21-22. This lower standard of suspicion is justified in part because of the
limited intrusiveness of the stop. See id. at 26-27.
1111 Smith, 799 F.2d at 711.
162 Id.
11 ' 3 See Hernandez, 55 F.3d at 445; Smith, 799 F.2d at 708. Eight of the federal circuits had
explicitly or implicitly adopted some form of the Could Have Test. See Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at
787; Scopo, 19 F.3d at 784; Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730; Mitchell, 951 F.2d at 1295; Cummins, 920 F.2d
at 501; Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041; Causey, 834 F.2d at 1185; Hawkins, 811 F.2d at 213.
164 See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769,1774-75 (1996).
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police officer would have stopped the defendant for the pretextual
reasons given—thus adopting the Could Have Test.' 65 The Court also
reaffirmed that when an officer has probable cause to search or arrest,
there is no requirement to balance the governmental and individual
interests to figure out the reasonableness of the search.'""
IV. WHREN V. UNITED STATES
A. The Facts
On the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice officers of the
Washington, D.C. police department were patrolling a "high drug use"
area in two unmarked cars when they noticed a Nissan Pathfinder with
temporary tags stopped at a stop sign. 167 Officer Ephraim Soto ob-
served the driver looking at the lap of the passenger. 1 "8 The Pathfinder
remained at the stop sign for more than twenty seconds, obstructing
the traffic behind it. 169
 The police officers decided to tail the Pathfinder
and initiated a U-turn."'} As the police returned to the intersection,
they observed the Pathfinder turn suddenly without signaling and
speed off at an "unreasonable" speed."' The police caught up with the
Pathfinder while it was stopped at a light and one of the officers
approached the driver, James Brown." 2 After telling Brown to put the
vehicle in park, Officer Soto observed two large bags of cocaine in pas-
senger Michael Whren's lap."3
 The police arrested Brown and Whren
and a subsequent search of the vehicle turned up additional illegal
narcotics."' Brown and Whren were charged with violating multiple
federal drug laws and they moved to suppress the seized drugs."' The
defendants argued that the stop was illegal because the police lacked
reasonable suspicion to believe they were involved in drug activity.""
Id.
165 Id. at 1777. The Court did concede that in extraordinary circumstances, which are not
present in a routine traffic stop, the Court. would require more than probable cause 1Or a search
to he reasonable. Id.
1117
 See United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct, 1769 (1996).
1 " See id.
I" See id.
1711
 See id.
171 See id.
172
 See Whren, 53 E3d at 372-73.
175 See id. at 373.
174
 See id.
175
 See id.
171'
	 Whren, 116 S. Gt. at 1772.
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Furthermore, they argued that the reason given for stopping the Pathfin-
der, to issue a traffic warning, was a pretext. 177
The District Court for the District of Columbia denied the defen-
dants' motion to suppress and the court subsequently convicted and
sentenced them. 178 On appeal, petitioners argued that the police used
the traffic violations as a pretext for investigating suspected drug activ-
ity.' 7" Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
should adopt the Would Have Test used at that time by the Ninth,
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.'" The D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of
defendants' motion to suppress and reaffirmed that a traffic stop is
permissible if a reasonable officer could have stopped the car for the
suspected traffic violation: 8 ' Whren and Brown then petitioned the
Supreme Court for a grant of certiorari and, after having denied
certiorari on cases raising the same issue at least seven times, the Court
decided to resolve the circuit split. 182
B. The Petitioners' Argument
Whren and Brown argued that the Court should adopt the Would
Have Test and, alternatively, that the Court should balance the govern-
ment's need to conduct traffic stops by plainclothes officers in un-
marked vehicles against the defendants' rights to be free from unrea-
sonable searches: 83 Petitioners argued that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to prevent arbitrary invasions by the police and thus
probable cause is a necessary but not a sufficient requirement for a
search. 184 In other contexts, they argued, the Court has required more
than probable cause.'" Petitioners argued that the Court should re-
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 See Whrett, 53 F.3d at 379-76.
1811 See id, at 374.
181 See id, at 375-76. The D.C. Circuit had earlier implicitly adopted the Could Have 'rest in
United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.3d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
182 See United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877 (1994); United
States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane), cell denied, 513 U.S. 828 (1994); United
States v. Hassan El, 5 E3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1006 (1994); United States
v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 923 (1992); United States v.
Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962 (1991); United States v. Trigg,
878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962 (1991); United States v. Hawkins, 831
F.2d 210 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 833 (1987).
155 See Petitioner's Brief at 13-15, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No.
95-5841).
154 See id. at 15-16.
15.5
	 id. at 16-17 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1 (1985); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984).
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quire more than probable cause here as well because seizure based on
a traffic code violation does not sufficiently restrain police behavior
given that motorists often violate the traffic code. 186 This unlimited
discretion to stop motorists invites police abuse, they claimed. 187
In addition, petitioners argued that the Court's previous decisions
supported adopting the Would Have Test. 188
 Petitioners based their
contention on the Court's previous rejection of the pretextual use
of government authority in administrative searches and inventory
searches.' 89
 Although the Court had said that it would not consider an
individual officer's subjective motivations in determining the reason-
ableness of the search, the Court had not previously said what stand-
ard should govern pretextual searches.'" Petitioners argued that the
Would Have Test was consistent with the Court's precedent because it
did not evaluate the state of mind of the officer who made the stop,
but instead evaluated what a reasonable officer would have done. 191
They argued that if the actual officer did not follow the procedures a
reasonable officer would have followed, the officer acted arbitrarily.' 92
Because the officers in Whren were not following Washington D.C.
police procedures when they stopped Brown, the petitioners asked the
Court to conclude that the stop was arbitrary and a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.'"
Furthermore, petitioners asked the Court to conclude that the
stop was also unreasonable because its intrusiveness outweighed the
government's interest in acting contrary to its own procedures.'" The
reasonableness of a search is determined, petitioners argued, by bal-
ancing the competing interests. 19' Petitioners asserted that allowing
plainclothes officers to pursue traffic violators did not promote the
government's interest in safety.'" To support this assertion, they cited
Metropolitan Police Department regulations which showed that the
offenses Brown committed were minor and that officers out of uniform
186 See. Petitioner's Brief at 17-18.
197
 See id. at 21.
I" See id. at 30.
189
 See id. (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372
(1987); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27 (1987); and dicta in Colorado v. Bannister,
449 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 (1980)).
'60 See id. at 31.
191 See Petitioner's Brief at 32.
192 See id. at 36-37.
193 See id. at 37.
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 See Petitioner's Brief at 38.
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or in unmarked cars were only to enforce traffic violations that were
so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.' 97
Weighed against these factors, Brown and Whren insisted that
their Fourth Amendment interests were decisive.' 98 They argued that
traffic stops by plainclothes officers in unmarked cars are more intru-
sive than normal roadside stops because motorists are uncertain of the
identity of the person who is stopping them. 199 Traffic stops by plain-
clothes police in unmarked cars are also more arbitrary than stops by
uniformed police in cruisers, petitioners argued.20° On balance, peti-
tioners contended, their rights to be free from arbitrary, intrusive
searches outweighed the marginal contributions to safety gained by
such stops. 2°' Thus, the petitioners asked the Court to suppress all
evidence from the illegal search. 202
C. The Decision
Writing for a unanimous bench, Justice Scalia began the Court's
analysis by recognizing that a traffic stop is a seizure for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes and thus requires probable cause that a traffic violation
has occurred. 203 Noting that the district court had found that the police
had probable cause to believe that Brown had violated the traffic code,
the Court rejected petitioners' argument that the proper standard for
determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop is whether a reason-
able police officer would have stopped Brown fix- the reasons given. 204
The proper standard for determining the constitutionality of a traffic
stop, the Court stated, is whether the police officer had probable cause
to stop the motorist. 205
In addition, the Court did not find petitioners' proposed stand-
ard, the Would Have Test, consistent with its precedent. 206 Justice Scalia
distinguished the cases upon which petitioners relied as cases where
197 See id. at 40-41.
198 See id. at 47.
199 See id. at 45.
200 See id. at 46.
201 See Petitioner's Brief at 47.
2°2 See id. at 50.
203 18"hren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769,1772 (1996).
2"Id. at 1774-75,1777.
2°5 /d. at 1777.
21 '6 /d. at 1773. Justice Scalia distinguished petitioners' cases, Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1
(1990); Colorado v. Bennie, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); and New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987),
as cases where the searches were conducted in the absence or probable cause. These cases all
dealt with adtninisu -ative or inventory searches. See id.
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the type of search did not require any suspicion of wrongdoing. 207
Those cases all dealt with administrative or inventory searches." In
cases where the search required probable cause, justice Scalia said that
the Court's precedent clearly established that an officer's subjective
intent is irrelevant to the constitutional reasonableness of a search. 20"1
Having foreclosed the possibility that an officer's actual, subjective
intent determined the reasonableness of a search founded on probable
cause, the Court then rejected the petitioners' proposed objective test,
declaring that subjective criteria influenced it as wel1. 211) The Court
explained that the petitioners' test asked whether the judge found it
plausible to believe that the officer had the proper state of mind. 2 "
Justice Scalia stated that the Court was not concerned with the per-
ceived danger of the pretextual sto p. 212 The Fourth Amendment allows
certain actions in certain circumstances regardless of the officer's sub-
jective intent, he said. 213 For example, the Court authorizes officers to
search incident to a custodial arrest because of a concern that the
person might be armed. 2 " It is, however, irrelevant whether a particular
officer believes a particular arrestee is armed; the custodial arrest
authorizes the search regardless:2 ' 5 justice Scalia also rejected the idea
that the Court's prior decisions required police to follow standardized
procedures when conducting searches founded upon probable cause. 216
Justice Scalia noted that if the Court were concerned with pretext,
which it was not, figuring out the officer's subjective intent would be
easier than figuring out what a reasonable officer's motive might have
been. 217
 Furthermore, the Court spurned linking Fourth Amendment
protections to the vagaries of individual police districts. 218
Finally, the Court acknowledged that the reasonableness of a search
does require a balancing of the government's and the individual's
interests; however, except in extreme situations, the fact that an officer
Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773.
208 See id. at 1774.
2liv
tin Id
211 hi .
212
 Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774-75.
213 Id. al 1775.
214 See id.
215 See id.
236 Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775-76.
211 Id. al 1775. "Wt seems to us somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an individual
officer ihan to plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine
whether a 'reasonable officer' would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation." id.
218 See id.
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has probable cause to believe that an offense has occurred is dispositive
for determining the reasonableness of the search. 219 A traffic stop
conducted by a plainclothes officer in an unmarked vehicle is not such
an extreme practice that warrants heightened protection. 229 Thus, the
Court upheld the lower courts' decisions and ruled that the evidence
could be admitted.22 '
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED LIMITATIONS ON
POLICE DISCRETION
In adopting the Could Have Test, Whren ends the debate about
pretextual stops for federal courts. Where there is probable cause to
stop a motorist, the Court will not snoop for pretext. 222 The Whren
219 See id. at 1776.
229 See id. at 1777. There are many examples of extreme conduct that warrant requiring more
than probable cause. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (seizure by deadly force); Wilson
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (unannounced entry into a home); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753 (1985) (searches that physically penetrated the body); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740
(1984) (entry into a home without a warrant).
221 Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 11777. In that the evidence was not suppressed, Whren reflects a larger
federal judiciary trend to limit the applicability and scope of the Exclusionary Rule. The Ber-
ger/Rehnquist Court has limited the Exclusionary Rule by restricting a defendant's standing to
challenge tainted evidence. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980); United States
v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978). The Court has
also narrowly confined the applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to certain aspects of criminal
trials. The Exclusionary Rule does not apply to habeas corpus review, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 494 (1976); immigration hearings, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984);
impeachment of defendant's testimony, see United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1980);
civil trials, see United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976); or grand jury proceedings, see
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974). The Court has also circumscribed the
applicability of the exclusionary remedy to police misconduct; it does not apply to misconduct
by legislatures, see Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1987) or court personnel, see Arizona
v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1995). Nor does the Exclusionary Rule apply to unintentional
misconduct by police. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (establishing a good
faith exception).
222 See. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774. The C,overnment and the Court did not care if a stop was
pretextual. This is seen in the following exchange, when respondent's counsel struggled to
explain why it was reasonable for the police to have stopped Brown:
"QUESTION: Is there anything else to explain why officer Soto, who said, I don't ordinarily
do this, would have done it in this case when the traffic violations were not particularly egregious?
MR. FELDMAN [respondent's counsel): There—I'm not sure how egregious they were.
Driving at an unreasonable speed in particular can be thought to be a serious offense.
QUESTION: Of course, you really don't care, Mr. Feldman, do you?
MR. FELI)MAN: No. No. In our—
QUESTION: Let's be honest.
(Laughter.)
Mr. Feldman: In our view 0-166 mean, these are the facts—
QUESTION: You said you will allow pretextual stops.
MR. FELI)MAN: In our-
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Court adopted the correct standard for evaluating whether a traffic
stop is initially justified. The petitioner's proposed test would have
been difficult for courts to apply, administratively costly, confusing to
police and ineffective in limiting unjustified searches. 223 The Could
Have Test, on the other hand, provides a workable standard for deter-
mining whether an officer was justified in stopping a motorist. 224 Nei-
ther test, however, addresses the real problem underlying pretextual
traffic stops, which is that police have vast, unchecked discretion to
expand the scope of the initially justified traffic stop into an unjustified
general search 225 State legislatures and state courts should correct this
shortfall.
A. The Would Have Test Would Not Have Helped
The Would Have Test would have proven problematic because it
is difficult and administratively costly for courts to decide what a rea-
sonable officer would have done. 226 Furthermore, the Would Have Test
does not provide clear guidance to law enforcement on whether a stop
is reasonable. 227 Finally, the Would Have Test ignores the real problem
because it focuses on whether a reasonable police officer in the same
situation would have exercised his or her legal authority and not on
whether a police officer should have such authority in the first place.
Under the Would Have Test, in order to establish pretext, a de-
fendant has to show that a reasonable officer would not have stopped
him.228 But who is this reasonable officer? Should courts look at what
QUESTION: So long as he has a proper reason to stop, pretextual or not, you're (sic) don't
care.
MR. FELDMAN; That's correct.
QUESTION: You're just being nice to Justice Ginsburg in trying to give her some reasons
why—
(Laughter)."
Transcript of Oral Arguments, Whren v. United States (April 17, 1996), available in WEST-
LAW, 1996 WL 195296, at 40-41.
The Court did indicate, however, that the Equal Protection Clause would apply if there was
a discriminatory animus lurking behind the pretext. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777. In this subset
of pretextual cases, defendants may have federal recourse through the Equal Protection Clause.
But see generally Randall S. Susskind, Note, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31
AM. CRIM. L. REV, 327, 339-42 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of making an equal protection
claim).
223 SeeUnited States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787-88 (10th Cir. 1995) (en bane); United
States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
224
 See Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392.
225 See I LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 1.4(e), at 123.
226
 See Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787-88; Ferguson, 8 F.3(.1 at 392.
227 See Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787-88; Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392.
225 See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986).
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the individual officer normally does, what police in his or her unit
normally do or what police throughout the state normally do? 229 What
circumstances should courts take into account in determining what a
reasonable officer would do? For example, should it matter that an
officer is more or less likely to pull someone over because it is late at
night, because it is rush hour or because it is close to the end of the
month? The search for this reasonable officer character proves just as
elusive as the search for that other legal incarnation, the reasonably
prudent person.
Besides being subjective, the search for what the reasonable officer
would have done is administratively expensive. 23° In each traffic stop
case, the Would Have Test compels courts to hold hearings to decide
what a police department's practices were and whether the officers
followed them."' In some cases, the presence of police regulations may
help the courts to identify a standard procedure, but often no regula-
tion will cover the questioned practice. 232 If no regulations exist, courts
must either try to learn what the standard practice is by interviewing
a representative sample of police officers or decide for themselves
whether the police officer's conduct was reasonable. 2" The former is
time consuming; the latter is speculative. The few instances where
229 The Tenth Circuit's experience is illuminating. In 1988, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit adopted the Would Have Test. See United States v. Guzman, 864 E2d 1512, 1517
(10th Cir. 1988). The court framed the inquiry as whether, in pulling the motorist over, the officer
had deviated from the usual practices of the police officers in the state. See id. But how do you
determine what the "usual practices of the police" are? The Tenth Circuit could not find a
consistent approach. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 877 (10th Cir. 1994)
(defining in terms of the practices of an individual unit of the highway patrol); United States v.
Harris, 995 F.2d 1004, 1006 (10th Cir. 1993) (defining in terms of the common practices of
particular officers); Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1518 (defining in terms of an entire state police force).
In part because of the inconsistencies inherent in the Guzman standard, the Tenth Circuit finally
abandoned the Would Have Test as "unworkable" in Bolero-Ospina. See 71 F.3d at 788.
250 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. ilvv. 349,
436-37 (1974).
"Inquiry into a police department's standard procedures may be counterproductive. In
many cases there is no established practice, and once courts start scrutinizing standard practices,
there may be little incentive for a police department to establish them. But see 1 LAFAvE, supra
note 23, § 1.4(e), at 124-25 (arguing for greater use of police standard procedures as a check
on police arbitrariness).
.2:3 See Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 942 ti.7 (Tex. Grim. App. 1992).
2" Courts could require police to establish and follow standard procedures. Given the
unpredictable situations a police officer is likely to encounter, however, standard procedures
might he difficult to design. There is also a danger that standard procedures would tend to limit
creative police work.
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pretext will be proven does not justify the administrative expense in
ferreting it out.234
If the Court had adopted the Would Have Test, it would have
found that this search for the reasonable officer not only perplexes
courts but that it also befuddles police. 2'S One of the goals of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is to provide police with a clear standard
as to the constitutionality of their actions. 23t' The Would Have Test does
not do this. The Would Have Test would require an officer to make
the same inquiries that the trial court will conduct. The officer would
have to ask in each instance: Would a reasonable officer make this stop?
How many officers are going to think that the reasonable officer would
act differently? Given the difficulty courts have had in deducing what
a reasonable officer would have done, why should we expect police
officers in the heat of the chase to figure it out?
Moreover, the reasonable officer is going to do what works. If
police find it productive to use traffic stops to investigate drug traffick-
ing, then it will become the standard procedure of police to stop
motorists for every possible minor infraction.2" Once police link drug
enforcement with traffic code enforcement, showing that a reasonable
police officer would not have stopped a motorist for the traffic offense
alone will be difficult, because a reasonable officer would not consider
these separate events."' The reasonable officer will believe that strict
enforcement of the traffic code is necessary in part because the stop
might potentially yield drugs. Thus, standard police procedures are
going to gravitate toward what is efficient, and there is no assurance
that these standard procedures will properly consider a motorist's
individual liberty interests. Whether a traffic stop violates the Fourth
234 See Amsterdam, supra note 230, at 436-37.
2" See Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392.
2" See United States v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981).
237 See Amsterdam, supra note 230, at 436-37 ("Motivation is ... a self-generating phenome-
non: if a purpose to search for heroin can legally be accomplished only when accompanied by a
purpose to search for a weapon, knowledgeable officers will seldom experience the first desire
without. :I simultaneous onrush of the second.").
2:" Suppose that a motorist argues that a police officer would not have stopped him or her
except thr the invalid purpose—to investigate drug trafficking. Under the Would Have Test, the
motorist would have to show that no reasonable officer would have pulled him or her over thr
the traffic code violation unless they also wanted to investigate drug trafficking. But a reasonable
officer in this jurisdiction does strictly enforce the traffic code. When the courts ask other police
officers if they would have stopped the motorist for the traffic offense, they will find that they do.
Of course, the enforcement is in part because they hope to find drugs. But this pretextual reason
is absorbed into the standard procedures and culture of police such that it is no longer a
pretextual reason but part of the justification for strict enforcement of the traffic code.
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Amendment should not depend upon the vagaries of police depart-
ment procedures concerning which laws they enforce and which ones
they do not enforce.2" Arbitrary police behavior should not be permis-
sible simply because it is standardized. 24°
Because the Would Have Test lets the reasonable officer define
the constitutionality of a search, it does not address the real issue,
which is that police have too much discretion to conduct searches
when little or even no justification exists. 24 ' Given the difficulty in
proving pretext and the ease with which police officers can hide their
subjective motivations, defendants would rarely succeed in showing
that a reasonable officer would not have stopped them except for the
invalid reason. 242 Consequently, the reasonable officer standard is an
illusory guarantor of individual liberty.
B. The Could Have Test Is a Workable Standard
The Whren decision was pragmatic in that the Court adopted a
workable standard for evaluating the justification for initiating a traffic
stop."' If the police have probable cause that an infraction has oc-
curred, they can initiate the stop. 2" This makes sense because, as
Justice Scalia observed, there is no principle for determining when a
legal code becomes so expansive or so ignored that the infraction itself
is no longer a measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. 245
 Further-
more, there is no judicial principle for determining which sections of
a code the courts should ignore. 246
 If citizens do not want the police
2" See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (1996); see also Bolero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at
788; Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392.
24°The Orlando Sentinel investigation revealed that the Volusia drug squad had adopted
standard procedures. See Steve Berry, Legal ExperLs Say .Seizures Appear Illegal, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
August 23, 1992, at All. After stopping the driver, usually a minority, for a minor traffic offense,
the officer would ask to see the license. See id. While returning the license, the officer would say,
"By the way, you're not carrying any drugs, guns or bombs, are you?" Following the driver's
response the officer would ask "You mind if I take a quick look?" See id.
241 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 5.2(e), at 86.
242 The paucity of protection the Would Have Test provides is illustrated by the fact that the
Tenth Circuit only once relied on the Would Have Test to reverse an order denying suppression,
and in that one case, the search would have been invalid under the Could Have Test as well. See
Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 786.
245 See Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 890 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
244 See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777. Pretextual traffic stops that are limited in scope are not
inherently dangerous and they may even be beneficial in some circumstances. For example, police
can use minor violations as a way to investigate whether a driver is intoxicated or unalert. 111 these
situations the intrusion is minor and the benefits to public safety are potentially great.
24." See id.
246 .See id. The Whren decision was driven by the practical concerns surrounding how a court
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to enforce a provision of the code, they should have the legislature
remove it. 247 The danger of pretextual traffic stops does not stem from
the strict enforcement of minor traffic violations, but from the expan-
sion of a limited stop into a full-blown search and seizure without the
attendant justification or prior judicial approval.
C. Addressing the Real Problem—Limiting the Scope of the Stop
In so far as it chose the correct standard for determining whether
the initial traffic stop is justified, the Court correctly decided Whren.
Whren does not, however, address the problems associated with the
virtually unlimited discretion that police officers have to arbitrarily
increase the scope of the initial stop. Now that the Court's decision in
Whren has made it easier for police to initiate a stop, more attention
needs to be paid to limiting the intrusiveness of a traffic stop. Whren
and other recent decisions indicate the Court's unwillingness to use
the Federal Constitution to protect the rights of motorists. The Court
has left this matter to the states, and states should move to limit the
broad search and seizure powers that police are authorized to use
during routine traffic stops.
Citizens should fear the arbitrary expansion of routine traffic stops
into broader searches and seizures because some police officers abuse
their discretion both in choosing which individuals to stop and in using
the stop solely for investigating unrelated crimes. For example, in
Florida, the Orlando Sentinel obtained video tape from 1,084 traffic
stops on Interstate 95. 248 The tape revealed that the police issued only
nine citations, yet they searched and frisked motorists in almost half
the stops and they made arrests in five percent of the stops. 24" Reports
from other states are also disturbing. On the New Jersey Turnpike,
African-Americans and Hispanics made up approximately seventy per-
cent of the arrests of one group of troopers, even though African-
would determine that a stop was pretextual. As Justice Kennedy noted in Wilson, the Whren Court
could find no other workable rule. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
x47 Both the Tenth and Sixth Circuits adopted the Could Have Test in part because they
concluded that courts should leave to the state legislatures the task of determining how the traffic
laws should he enforced. See Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 788; Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392.
248 See, ieff Brazil et al., Color of Driver is Key to Stops in 1 -95 Videos, ORLANDO SENTINEI„ Aug.
23, 1992, at Al. The Orlando Sentinel investigation revealed how easily the traffic code can be
exploited. Of the 1,084 stops, 253 were for swerving, 237 for following too closely, 128 kir speeding
1-10 mph over the limit, 71 for a burned out license tag light, 46 for an improper tag, 45 for
failure to signal a lane change, 27 for speeding 11 mph or more, 22 for an unsafe lane change,
17 for weaving and 228 unknown or miscellaneous. See id.
249 See id.
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Americans and Hispanics represented only five percent of the drivers
on the relevant section of the turnpike.25" In Utah, a trooper admitted
that he was trained to stop Hispanic motorists and that in eighty
percent of these stops he asked permission to search the vehicle." And
in Texas, the Fifth Circuit noted the remarkable record of a state
trooper who had made 250 drug arrests in conjunction with traffic
stops. 252 Yet, how many innocent motorists did this trooper search in
order to unearth the 250 drug traffickers?
Past police abuse points to the need to maintain appropriate
checks on police discretion. Accordingly, state courts and legislatures
should concern themselves with limiting the authority of police forces
to expand a search beyond the apparent justification. It seems unlikely
that in Utah eighty percent of Hispanic drivers warrant a full-blown
vehicle search; the state would be well advised to step in and protect
individuals from such arbitrary police intrusions. More specifically,
states should limit an officer's discretion to make custodial arrests for
minor traffic offenses. States should also require police to inform
motorists that they are free to leave prior to asking permission for a
consensual search. Finally, states should recognize that Maryland v.
Wilson, which allowed police to order passengers out of cars during
traffic stops, illustrates the Court's no-frills view of Fourth Amendment
liberty, and therefore states should provide greater protection of pas-
sengers' rights. 252
1. Limit the Power to Arrest
States should limit the power of police officers to make custodial
arrests for traffic violations.254 Most states give police complete discre-
tion to arrest a motorist for minor traffic offenses. 255 Other states have
20 See Henry P. Curtis, Statistics Show Pattern of Discrimination, ORLANDO SENTINEL Aug. 23,
1992, at All.
251 See State v. Arroyo, 796 11.2d 684, 688 n.3 (Utah 1990).
252 See United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1993).
253
 See. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
254 Limiting the authority of the police to arrest a motorist for a minor offense such as a
traffic offense is nut a new idea. See, e.g., Edwin J. Rutterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The
Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme. Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext
Doctrine, 79 Ky. Lj. 1, 7 (1990); Thomas R. Folk, The Case for Constitutional Ganstraints Upon the
Power to Make Full Custodial Arrests, 48 U. Cm L. REV. 321, 323 (1979); Salken, supra note 8, at
252. The need to limit police authority, however, is now more urgent because 111tren explicitly
authorizes police to use a minor traffic violation as a means of investigating more serious crime.
See 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
255 See Salken, supra note 8, at 250 n.188.
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only minimal checks on police discretion to arrest.256 States should take
the lead in limiting custodial arrests to serious offenses, such as drunk
driving, and they should clearly define with objective criteria the of-
fenses for which an officer may arrest and those for which an officer
is limited to issuing a citation. 25i 7 By limiting the officer's power to
arrest, the legislature would limit the concomitant power to search and
thus curb the temptation to stop a motorist for an alternative pretex-
tual purpose.
Where legislatures are slow to enact such reforms, state courts
should consider declaring custodial arrests for minor traffic violations
to be unreasonable under their own constitutions.'" A full custodial
arrest for a minor traffic violation is arguably a violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 2" State courts should
construe similar provisions in state constitutions to forbid custodial
arrests for traffic violations. 26° By limiting custodial arrests and the
broad search powers that attend them, the states can protect the
privacy and liberty rights of citizens who are guilty merely of minor
traffic infractions—namely, just about everyone.
2. Require Informed Consent
The Supreme Court of the United States has provided minimal
constitutional protection for consensual searches—they need only be
voluntary."' Although the Supreme Court has declined to create a
requirement that police inform a person that he or she can refuse to
consent to a search, state courts are free to do so. 2"2 Because of the
coercive nature of consensual searches during traffic stops, states should
256 See id. at 251 n.189.
257 Instead of limiting an officer's options to arrest or cite, states could adopt a broad array
of procedures. For example, where states are concerned that an outof-state driver would not pay
the fine, they could require the motorist to post a bond on the spot using a credit card or cash.
258 The Supreme Court of the United States has not addressed the constitutionality of
custodial arrest for minor offenses. However, in Gusinftan v. Flarida, Justice Stewart wrote a
concurring opinion suggesting that a full custodial arrest for a minor traffic violation might have
violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. See 414 U.S. 260, 2611-67 (1973) (Stewart,
concurring), The Court did not rule on this issue because Gustafson had not raised it below.
See id.
259 See generally Salken, supra note 8, at 259-273 (arguing custodial arrests for minor traffic
stops are unconstitutional).
260 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I § 12; OHio CoNsT. art. 1 § 14; MASS, DECLARATION OF RICI1TS
Pt. 1 art. XIV.
261 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
262 See Ohio v. Robinette, 116 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996).
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expand upon this federal protection by adopting prophylactic meas-
ures such as the bright-line informed consent test in Robinette a search
will be consensual only if a motorist consents after the police officer
informs him that he is free to leave. 263
Considering the difficulty the courts have had articulating the
standard for when a stop occurs and what its proper scope is, the courts
should not naively believe that citizens will routinely correctly decide
what is in their best interest. 264 States should not allow police to prey
on citizens' ignorance of their rights to justify expansive fishing expe-
ditions. 265
 An informed consent rule would reduce random searches,
but it would still allow police to expand their search if they had a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 266
 Reasonable suspicion is not
an overly burdensome requirement.
In Robinette, the Ohio Supreme Court established the bright-line
test because the court found it difficult to believe that citizens were
voluntarily consenting to intrusive searches. 267 Prior to the Ohio Su-
preme Court's Robinette decision, the Ohio Court of Appeals had ob-
served that traffic stops were routinely used as a pretext for narcotics
searches. 2" The Court of Appeals had noted that hundreds, and per-
haps thousands, of Ohio citizens were being routinely delayed in their
travels and asked to relinquish to uniformed police officers their right
to privacy in their automobiles and luggage, sometimes for no better
reason than to provide an officer the opportunity to practice his drug
interdiction technique. 2"
In reviewing, the United States Supreme Court overturned the
Ohio Court because its decision appeared to be based on federal
constitutional law and not independent state grounds.'" However, on
remand, the Ohio court was free to adopt such protection under its
own constitution. 271
 Other states should follow Ohio's lead.
263 See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 697 (Ohio 1995), reu'd sub nom, Ohio v. Robinette,
116 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996).
264 See Berkerner v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984).
26'9 See Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 699.
2c4 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
See Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 697.
26M See State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 503 & n.3 (Ohio Ct. App.), dismissed, jurisdictional
motion overruled by 635 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 1994).
26S Id. (The Deputy involved had asked motorists to consent to a search of their vehicles 786
limes in 1992).
2711 See Robinette, 116 S. Ct. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
271 See id.
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3. Limit the Reach of Wilson
By itself, Maryland v. Wilson may be a reasonable accommodation
of the states' interests in protecting police officers and the liberty
interests of passengers. 272 In light of Whren, however, and its holding
that an officer's subjective intent in making a traffic stop is irrelevant
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the possibility of abuse is
great. 273 For an officer bent on pushing the law to its limit in order to
investigate drug trafficking, Wilson provides the authority to expand
the officer's plain view dramatically. 274 The Court now permits such an
officer to routinely empty a car so that he or she can see all of the
passengers and the entire interior of the car.
States should limit the power of police to use Wilson as an inves-
tigatory tool. Rather than allow police the automatic right to empty a
car, state courts and legislatures should require police to articulate
some minimal objective basis for suspecting that a passenger could
pose a danger.275 While still protecting police, this would reduce the
temptation to use a traffic stop to investigate other crimes. Although
the Supreme Court has provided passengers minimal Fourth Amend-
ment protection, states are free to expand protection of passengers'
rights—and should do so.27"
VI. CONCLUSION
In the aggregate, Whren, Robinette and Wilson profoundly change
the rights of motorists and alter the complexion of traffic stops. In
Whren, the Supreme Court correctly decided that an officer may stop
a motorist if the officer has reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense
has occurred. 277 There is no need to ask whether a reasonable officer
would have stopped the motorist—reasonable suspicion that an of-
fense has been committed is sufficient. 278 This is the proper standard
272 See 117 S. Ct. 882, 885-86 (1997).
273 See id. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("When Whren is coupled with today's holding, the
Court puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police.").
271 See id. at 884.
275 See id, (Kennedy, j., dissenting) ("The requisite showing for commanding passengers to
exit need be no more than the existence of any circumstance justifying the order in the interests
of the officer's safety or to facilitate a lawful search or investigation.").
276 See Oregon V. Hass, 42{) U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("IA) State is free as a matter of its own law
to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon
federal constitutional standards.").
277 See 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (1996).
278 See id.
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for determining whether the initial stop is justified. Nevertheless, sus-
picion that a motorist has violated the traffic code is not a sufficient
restraint on police discretion to justify an officer's expansion of the
scope of the stop into a full-scale search for criminal activity. Weaving,
swerving and following too closely are insufficient indicators of serious
crime and, given the potential intrusiveness of a stop, additional limits
must be placed on a police officer's discretion so that the scope of the
search comports with the justification. The Supreme Court has left this
task to the states, and state courts and legislatures should adopt meas-
ures to limit the scope of a traffic stop. By limiting the power to arrest,
ensuring that a motorist's consent is informed, and limiting an officer's
right to remove passengers from a stopped car, states can help ensure
that the intrusion is limited to the justification. If the legislature or the
courts confine the search to the logical limits of a traffic stop—citation,
registration check and questioning about the offense—then a police
officer's motive for initially stopping a motorist is not so important. It
is only when the police are permitted to conduct unrestrained fishing
expeditions that pretext matters.
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